Before we can really dive into modifying GPOs, we need to try and understand some of the intricacies of how they’re updated normally in GPMC and AD. Because believe me, it aint as simple as it appears.

Group Policy Objects (GPOs) is a subject I’ve wanted to write about for a long time and I’m happy to have finally started.

As 2018 rapidly comes to an end, I thought I’d close out the year by clearing up some confusions over this AmsiScanBuffer bypass and why it appears to fail under some circumstances.

In Part 2, we engineered a delivery method for the AmsiScanBuffer Bypass discussed in Part 1. In this post, we’ll make some modifications to the bypass itself.

In Part 1, we had a brief look at the AmsiScanBuffer bypass technique. We found some circumstances where the bypass code would be identified as malicious before it could be executed (which turned out to be a simple string detection), and modified the code to circumvent this.

In this post, we’ll explore a delivery method to help stage a Cobalt Strike / Empire / <insert framework here> agent. As with Part 1, this is not about some 1337 code drop - it’s a demonstration of how I walked through engineering the final result.

So, let’s get cracking.

Andre Marques recently posted a pretty nice write-up for circumventing AMSI, based on previous work by CyberArk.

With the emergence of more C# and .NET tooling, I occasionally see people tripping up over this. It’s not a huge issue, just something to be aware of.

Very quick post to explore some different ways to enumerate the AppLocker configuration being applied to a host, both remotely and locally. Understanding these rules, particularly deny rules, are useful for engineering bypasses.

This is just a quick post to demonstrate some interesting aspects of the Remote Desktop Clipboard Monitor.

In April 2018, Casey Smith published a finding he dubbed squiblytwo, which detailed how WMIC can be used to invoke arbitary code contained in the extensible stylesheet language (XSL) format.