I’ve added a new experimental project to TikiTorch, called TikiVader. I originally thought of “vader” as a play-on for “evade”/“evader”, until I realised TikiVader was never meant to evade anything… but nevermind 😒

The main impetus behind this post was me experimenting with ways to leverage TikiSpawn with some of the popular lolbins.

In my previous post, I described how one could leverage CVE-2019-0841 to backdoor the LAPS AdmPwd.dll for EoP to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The obvious question is that if a machine is not using LAPS, what can you do…? Well Rich Warren provided one solution, by using the Windows Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service.

On April 9, Nabeel Ahmed annouced details of CVE-2019-0841 - the tl;dr being that it allows low privileged users to take Full Control of files owned by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, which can lead to EoP. Nabeel published a comprehensive blog describing the vulnerability, PoC code and a video demonstration.

I recently created the EWSToolkit off the back of an assessment for Exchange Client Access Services. I realise I committed it with basically no explanation, so this blog post will serve as a quick introduction and a look at perhaps one of its more interesting features.

When TikiTorch was first released in February, it consisted of a single .NET assembly. Almost exactly a month later, I commited an update that increased that to four assemblies.

This blog post will cover what these assemblies are and how to use them.

Before we can really dive into modifying GPOs, we need to try and understand some of the intricacies of how they’re updated normally in GPMC and AD. Because believe me, it aint as simple as it appears.

Group Policy Objects (GPOs) is a subject I’ve wanted to write about for a long time and I’m happy to have finally started.

As 2018 rapidly comes to an end, I thought I’d close out the year by clearing up some confusions over this AmsiScanBuffer bypass and why it appears to fail under some circumstances.